Battlefront Baghdad: India Could Play Honest Broker

Monopolies are bad both in national and international politics. The unipolar world led by the US is an example of political monopoly. In the language of history and politics, monopolies are discussed in terms of balance of power. What we have today is an imbalance of power.
The US-led war against Iraq needs to be seen in the context of this imbalance.It has to be seen beyond the imminent fall of Baghdad and the new regime that will replace that of Saddam Hussein. There has been much talk about the need for a multipolar world as an ideal solution to the existing anarchy in the international arena.
Third World experts, painfully aware of the weaknesses of developing countries, believe that the reform of the UN by expanding the Security Council is an ideal way to restore the balance of power. Unfortunately, political solutions not backed by real economic and military power do not mean much. It is one of the lessons that is to be learnt from the inability of the three other permanent members of the Security Council — France, Russia and China — to prevent the US and UK from unleashing Gulf War II.
But balance of power is treated as a dirty word among liberals and other romantics. They want an egalitarian world order, where all countries — big and small — are supreme in the same way that citizens in a democracy are equal and important. And it is argued that the UN is based on the one country, one vote and all are equal principle. It would be necessary to take a realistic note of international politics, and accept the fact that small and weak countries cannot defend themselves against strong ones. Kuwait could not defend itself against Iraq in 1990, and Iraq is not in a position to weather the attack of the US, the UK and Australia in 2003.
What is needed is a modus operandi that will make it difficult, if not impossible, for strong countries to attack the weak. In 1990, the US and its coalition partners rightly came to the defence of small and vulnerable Kuwait when it was threatened by Iraq. The principle failed when it came to the question of the defence of Iraq. If France, Russia, China and Germany were opposed to the American war against Iraq, then they should have moved their forces to counter the threat posed by the Americans. That they did not do so goes to show that either all the other big powers are absolutely weak in the face of American power, or that all these powers, despite their loud protestations, acquiesce in American supremacy.
It is surprising then that those who are opposed to a unipolar world do not talk of the need to contain the US. The military option of containing the Americans is always there, though it would lead to mindless violence. And it may take too many wars to push the Americans back. Unchecked American power is bad for the world as well as for the Americans. It is not enough to be eloquently anti-American. There is need for credible action. And it can happen when the rest of the world ceases to depend on the American market and on the inflow of American dollars to boost their domestic economies.
But that can happen only in the long run. There is need for an immediate response. Countries like India cannot sit back and hope a multipolar world will emerge by force of circumstances. India has to work vigorously and creatively for the emergence of a multipolar world. The weapon that I ndia needs to wield is diplomacy. India can hope to combat the existing world order only through diplomacy.
What makes the Indian position over the war in Iraq unsatisfactory is that it is not willing to do anything more positive than stating its views, which are rooted in complex and conflicting reasons. But New Delhi can take the diplomatic initiative. India enjoys the confidence of the government in Baghdad, and the Americans know New Delhi’s concern with the threat of terrorism.
But India will have to play the truly honest broker. It is, of course, a treacherous assignment. The removal of Saddam Hussein does not ensure that a humiliated Iraq will become less dangerous. What is needed is the preservation of the sovereignty of Iraq in return for the surrender of WMDs. India should argue for an immediate ceasefire as it did in Korea in 1951 and in Congo in 1961. It is true that the geopolitical reality then was radically different from the present situation. But given the tough resistance that Americans are facing at the moment, it is possible to sell the idea of a ceasefire.
The UN arms inspectors must be accompanied by diplomatic corps from the European Union, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Arab League to make the exercise more transparent. India cannot take ideological potshots, or make calculated moves in a zero-sum game. The argument that India should allow the Americans to finish off with the change of regime in Baghdad, and then step in to help the Iraqi people is more naive than cynical. What is needed is an idealistic commitment to the idea of the integrity of sovereign states and world peace. Though hard to believe, India’s credibility lies in its idealism.