Bunkum from Bandung

Afro-Asian unity was a myth in 1955 and it is so in 2005. The two continents diverge widely, geographically as well as historically. Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism were not sufficient reasons for bonding then. The attempt made to rally developing countries in the two continents today is a feeble, if not hypocritical, one. Neither the G77 formation of the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) era of the 1970s nor the G20 of the present World Trade Orga-nisation (WTO) regime makes for a convincing alliance. The proceedings of the 1955 Bandung summit show that there was no unity of purpose even in the first flush of independence. Many nations, including Pakistan and Sri Lanka, then known as Ceylon, were deeply hostile to communism and felt safe in the camp of the western powers. This apprehension in the minds of so many Asian countries forced Chinese leaders of the time to state emphatically that there was a need to recognise and guarantee different political systems, which was the core of the Panchsheel doctrine. The Chinese wanted to ward off the real threat of American intervention in their country. The implicit concession in the Chinese stance was that it was not keen to export the communist revolution. China held to its promise more due to internal, rather than external, compulsions. Despite the impressive economic strides made by a few Asian nations in the last half a century, projects of unity have proved elusive. Apart from the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), there is no other formation comparable to European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). With three great powers — China, India, Japan — jostling for space, there cannot be a common formation either, east of the Indus. Pygmy formations like South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) do not stand a chance in the big league. The political bickering among its members makes it easy for the US to play an insidious role in the affairs of the region. West Asia is a different case. The Arab League has proved to be an ineffective platform. It is not entirely Asian in its membership as it includes many of the North African states. Libya's Muammar Gaddafi recognised the incongruity only recently and he now wants to get back to the African fold. Turkey prefers to be part of Europe; Iran stands uncomfortably alone. The African situation was radically different in the 1950s. Political and economic development was at a primitive stage, barring the North African states. The major inhibiting factor in the development of Africa at that time was the very small size of the middle class, which is the catalyst of change in any modernising economy. Analysts of Africa have never been honest enough to state this fact. And, like in Asia, the differences and rivalries between the many African states were underplayed on the pretext of presenting a picture of a united front. Geography dictates that Africans forge links only with West Asia, mainly the Gulf countries and Mediterranean Europe. But the underdeveloped economies of the Arab nations and of southern Europe make it necessary for Africans to look to the United States and the advanced capitalist countries of northern Europe. Political turmoil in Africa poses radically different challenges and makes it easy for western powers to intervene. The Asian and African countries at Bandung in 1955 were dependent on western powers for economic assistance and it became quite easy for the United States and other western donors to call the shots. The situation has not changed much today. Both Asian and African countries want to integrate with the developed economies of the West. Afro-Asian unity can only become a reality when Asian and African countries are able to trade with each other and profit from it. That seems quite a long way off. The writer, a journalist, is a commentator on foreign affairs.